Introduction
The current economic and political crisis has become an experience that immediately affects the life chances of many citizens. For many Europeans the necessity to cope with the negative consequences of crisis requires immediate responses and the development of resilience. This new immediateness of how Europe is experienced through crisis contrasts sharply with the many hurdles of mediation between the European Union (EU) political system and the lifeworlds of the citizens. Due to the technocratic character of the EU rescue measures, which are taken to secure economic and monetary stability, EU decision makers have become less responsive to the demands for public legitimation. Thus, while directly affecting millions of citizens, the crisis has at the same time widened the EU's public communication and legitimation deficit. EU institutions and national governments are under constraints to consolidate new regulatory competences, but they are at the same time increasingly deprived of the possibilities to legitimize these increased powers in a democratic fashion (Habermas 2013). They lack, in short, the mediating capacities to include the wider populations in informed opinion making and to respond to the concerns and fears of the people affected by crisis. And it is not only the communication aspect of crisis management that is lacking: the gulf between what is economically required and what is socially and democratically acceptable is widening. The conflicts at the core of the crisis increasingly reflect competing world views and ideologies that are difficult to reconcile. Instead of reconciling such fundamental conflicts, the media then appear as a further amplifier of conflict and cleavages: elites (national and EU) versus citizens; the crisis-ridden South versus the still-affluent North; the economic players and banks versus social welfare NGOs and protest movements that challenge financial capitalism.
Central to the crisis, both in terms of offering core mediating capacities and of providing the public stage for the crisis conflicts, are the available media spheres and infrastructures in Europe -new and old media, offline and online and news and social. Delving into the media perspective of the crisis is paramount for understanding how the Eurocrisis has turned into a major threat to democracy but also for formulating democratic solutions to the EU crisis and defining new ways of democratic empowerment. Mediating capacities are needed to arbitrate between the economic and the political rationale of crisis governance and to sustain vital information and communication flows between and across the four space dimensions of the crisis, namely, the local, the national, the European and the global.
Three factors complicate the mediation of crisis-related events and affect, on the one hand, the capacities of government to provide adequate information and communicate effectively to relevant stakeholders, and, on the other hand, the possibilities of audience formation and their potential to hold political representatives accountable. First, in times of crisis, it may be seemingly impossible to reconcile effective crisis management, which relies on quick executive decisions, with the democratic control mechanisms -including the media -designed to preserve and enforce autonomy and accountability. The Eurocrisis has given new momentum to the politicization of European integration, turning it into a mobilization force for intellectuals, political actors and citizens' movements (Statham and Trenz 2014) . In response to the EU 'constitutional crisis' and democratic deficits, the 'permissive consensus' characterizing public opinion before the 1990s has slowly been replaced by a 'constraining dissensus' through a process of public and media contestation (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Statham and Trenz 2012) . Societies respond with an intensification of insurgent politics (ad hoc citizens' protests, asymmetric communications) on the one hand, and with further depreciation of representative politics, on the other (Kriesi 2012). As such, the Eurocrisis is constitutive of a particular kind of public sphere that contests the legitimacy of governance, national and European.
Second, this emerging conflict of interests between crisis management and democratic governance is amplified exponentially when
